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Have Nonbank Banks Become a Nonissue Issue?
In the last five years, few industries have changed as rapidly as the
banking industry. Once viewed as stodgy and conservative, banks have
become increasingly aggressive and competitive. Banks and nonbank
businesses have expanded both their financial services and geographic
markets. Despite these changes, Congress, perhaps influenced by strong
lobbies, has not reformed old banking laws to meet new market condi-
tions. Consequently, federal courts and regulators have had difficulty ap-
plying dated laws to recent developments.
One such law is the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (the
"BHCA" or the "Act").1 The BHCA regulates a bank holding com-
pany's2 acquisitions of bank subsidiaries. 3 The Act also limits a bank
holding company's activities and interests in areas unrelated to banking.
4
The Act defines a bank as any institution organized under state or federal
law5 that meets both parts of the Act's two-pronged "bank" test. A bank
"(1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on
1. Bank Holding Company Act, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982)).
2. A "bank holding company" is defined as any company that controls any bank or
other bank holding company. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982). A "company" is defined as:
any corporation, partnership, business trust, association, or similar organization, or
any other trust unless by its terms it must terminate within twenty-five years or not
later than twenty-one years and ten months after the death of individuals living on
the effective date of the trust but shall not include any corporation the majority of the
shares of which are owned by the United States or any State.
Id. § 1841(b).
"Control" under the BHCA generally exists in three circumstances:
(1) a company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more persons owns, con-
trols, or has the power to vote 25 percent or more of any class of voting securities of a bank or
other company;
(2) a company controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors or
trustees of a bank or other company;
(3) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System determines that the company
directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of a
bank or other company. Id. § 1841(a)(2).
There are exceptions to the "control" rule, primarily when a company owns or controls
shares of a bank or other company in a fiduciary capacity or as security for a debt. See id.
§ 1841(a)(5).
3. Id. § 1842(a).
4. Id. § 1843(a).
5. The Act does not cover holding companies of federally chartered or insured savings
and loans. Such institutions are regulated under the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act
of 1967. Id. § 1730a.
demand, and (2) engages in the business of making commercial loans."
'6
In recent years, companies have avoided regulation under the BHCA by
acquiring financial institutions that do not meet one of the two prongs of
the "bank" test.7 These new financial hybrids, which often offer most
other types of banking services, have become known as "nonbank
banks." 8 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
("Board"), which enforces the BHCA,9 and many members of Congress
consider the BHCA "bank" definition to be a loophole that allows com-
panies owning nonbank banks to evade the Act's purposes.10
Parent companies see several advantages to owning nonbank banks.
First, nonbank bank parent companies may avoid the restrictions on ac-
tivities that otherwise would be imposed on them under the BHCA.11
Bank holding companies may not engage in nonbank activities, either
directly or by controlling nonbank subsidiaries, 12 unless the Board has
determined that an activity is "so closely related to banking... as to be a
proper incident thereto." 13 For example, Sears Roebuck and Company,
J.C. Penney, and Gulf and Western have maintained their commercial
businesses while entering the financial services industry by acquiring
nonbank banks.
14
Second, by escaping BHCA regulation, parent companies of non-
bank banks are able to provide a full array of financial services under one
roof, including consumer loans, insurance, demand deposits, savings ac-
counts, investment services, and real estate brokerage services. 15 Tradi-
6. Id. § 1841(c).
7. Between January 1, 1979, and March 12, 1985, 110 financial institutions owned by
nonbanking parent companies received or had applied for federal or state bank charters. Non-
bank Banks: Hearings on H.. 20 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions, Supervision,
Regulation, and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 105-10 (1985) [hereinafter Nonbank Bank Hearings] (appendix to statement of
James G. Cairns, Jr.). Although these bank charters authorize the recipient both to make
commercial loans and to accept demand deposits, the nonbanking parent companies have
avoided BHCA regulation by directing their financial institution subsidiaries to refrain from
one or both activities under the BHCA's "bank" definition. Felsenfeld, Nonbank Banks-An
Issue in Need of a Policy, 41 Bus. LAW. 99, 99 (1985).
8. See Felsenfeld, supra note 7, at 99; Lobell, Nonbank Banks: Controversy over a New
Form of Consumer Bank, 39 Bus. LAW. 1193, 1193 (1984).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (1982).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 175, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985); Scheibla, Ready or Not There's
Apt to be a Banking Law in '86, Barron's, May 27, 1985, at 15, col. 1.
11. Lobell, supra note 8, at 1194-96.
12. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1982).
13. Id. § 1843(c)(8). For a list of activities that the Board has ruled to be "closely related
to banking," see G. KAUFMAN, THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM: MONEY, MARKETS, AND IN-
STITUTIONS 170 (3d ed. 1986).
14. See Congress or the Courts May Close the Loophole, 17 NAT'L J. 1615 (1985).
15. An example of an institution providing full financial services under one roof is the
"Sears Financial Network," which provides depository and consumer banking services (Sears
Savings Bank), insurance sales (Allstate Insurance Co.), investment services (Dean Witter
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tional bank holding companies may not engage in such diverse activities
without violating the Glass-Steagall Act
16 or the BHCA.17
Third, nonbank bank parent companies may use their subsidiaries as
an inexpensive source of commercial credit. Financial institutions gener-
ally pay lower returns on consumer deposits, which are federally insured,
than commercial firms pay on loans, bonds, or commercial paper.
18
Nonbank bank subsidiaries may pass these savings on to their nonfinan-
cial parent companies by loaning them funds at below-market rates.19
Fourth, nonbank banks, like traditional banks, may insure deposits
up to $100,000 per depositor through the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC").20 This privilege gives nonbank banks a key com-
petitive advantage over uninsured financial institutions, because deposi-
tors often prefer placing their money in federally insured accounts over
uninsured or privately insured accounts. Although both nonbank banks
and traditional banks may insure their deposits through the FDIC, non-
bank banks have a competitive advantage over traditional banks as well,
because they are able to offer this important source of financial security
to depositors in addition to the other services not offered by traditional
banks, such as selling insurance or interstate banking.
Fifth, nonbank banks are not subject to federal anti-tying laws.21
These laws forbid traditional banks from making the extension of credit
to customers conditional on the customer's purchase of some additional
service or credit from the bank or bank holding company.
Reynolds Organization, Inc.), and real estate brokerage services (Coldwell Banker & Co.). See
Sears Becomes 'Sassy,' 17 NAT'L J. 1617 (1985).
16. The Glass-Steagall Act (also known as the Banking Act of 1933) authorizes national
banking associations, see infra note 24, to engage only in activities that are incidental and
necessary to the "business of banking." 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982). The Glass-Steagall Act also
prohibits, with certain exceptions, national banking associations from affiliating with organiza-
tions dealing in securities and prohibits securities dealers from engaging in the business of
banking. Id. §§ 377-378.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1982).
18. Lobell, supra note 8, at 1195. Federally insured deposits earn lower returns than
commercial credit instruments because they involve less risk. Between 1934 and 1975, 99.8%
of all depositors who held FDIC-insured accounts in failed banks recovered their deposits in
full. Barnett, Horwitz & Silverberg, Deposit Insurance: The Present System and Some Alterna-
tives, 94 BANKING L.J. 304, 306 (1977).
19. However, if a nonbank bank is a member of the Federal Reserve System, it faces
restrictions on transactions with its affiliates and shareholders. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371b-371c
(1982).
20. Id. § 1821(a). An FDIC-insured institution need not meet the "bank" test under the
BHCA, id. § 1841(c); rather, it must be either a national banking association under the Na-
tional Bank Act, id. § 21, or a state-chartered institution "engaged in the business of receiving
deposits" under applicable state law. See id. § 1813(a); see also Brief for the Petitioner at la-
7a, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681
(1986) (listing FDIC-insured nonbank banks as of April 12, 1985).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1982).
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Sixth, parent companies may establish out-of-state nonbank bank
subsidaries. The BHCA forbids bank holding companies from establish-
ing bank subsidiaries across state lines without state authorization under
the Douglas Amendment.2 2 Because of the competitive advantages of
interstate banking, large nonbank bank parent companies are eager to
expand their financial services networks across state lines by acquiring
limited-service banks.
23
Seventh, parent companies may use nonbank banks to charge inter-
est on outstanding credit card balances at rates that are higher than per-
missible under their home state usury laws. Nonbank banks are often
nationally chartered banking associations under the National Bank Act2
4
and thus have "most favored lender" status.2 5 This status allows nation-
ally chartered nonbank banks to charge interest at the maximum rate
allowed by state law to any competing state-chartered lending institu-
tion.26 Thus, when a parent company owns a nonbank bank in another
state with more permissive usury laws, the parent company may charge
higher interest rates on its outstanding credit card balances by issuing the
credit cards through its out-of-state nonbank bank subsidiary.
Because of these competitive advantages, the nonbank bank loop-
hole recently led to a proliferation of applications to the United States
Comptroller of the Currency for national bank charters,27 which have
been challenged by private banking associations. 28 In 1984, the Board
22. Id. § 1842(d); see infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
23. Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1986, at 3, col. 1 (Western ed.).
24. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-216d (1982 & Supp. III 1985). A "banking association" under the
National Bank Act need not be a "bank" under the BHCA; rather, it must only "carry on the
business of banking." Id. § 21. The Eighth Circuit has stated that the "business of banking"
consists of "accepting deposits, cashing checks, discounting commercial paper, and making
loans of money." Melton v. Unterreiner, 575 F.2d 204, 207 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978). Although
national banking associations have the power to make commercial loans and accept demand
deposits, some associations have become "nonbank banks" simply by not engaging in one or
both activities. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
25. "Most favored lender" status is derived from 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1982), which allows
banks to charge "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District
where the bank is located." See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S.
299, 313 (1978).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1986).
27. Nash, Deluge of 'Non-Bank Banks' Is Seen, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1986, at Dl, col. 3.
28. An issue related to the nonbank bank controversy, but not discussed here, is whether
the Comptroller of the Currency has the authority to issue national bank charters to nonbank
banks even if they arguably defeat the purposes of the BHCA. In a series of cases instituted by
the Independent Bankers Association of America and others, the plaintiffs attempted to enjoin
the Comptroller from issuing any charters to nonbank banks. See Independent Bankers Ass'n
of Am. v. Conover, 603 F. Supp. 948, 958 (D.D.C. 1985) (plaintiffs' motion to enjoin the
Comptroller from granting national bank charters to nonbank banks denied for failure to raise
a substantial issue of whether the nonbank banks were actually "banks" under the BHCA and
thus capable of violating the Act); Deerbrook State Bank v. Conover, 568 F. Supp. 696, 699
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (preliminary injunction denied because the Comptroller had not threatened to
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attempted to tighten the loophole and slow the spread of nonbank banks
by broadening the BHCA "bank" definition through Board orders, opin-
ions, and new regulations that liberally interpreted the "demand deposit"
and "commercial loan" prongs of the BHCA definition.29 Thus under
the Board regulation, more nonbank banks qualified under the "bank"
definition and were subject to Board supervision.
Until 1986, federal appellate courts diverged over the proper inter-
pretation of the BHCA "bank" definition and over the extent of the
Board's authority to prevent evasions of the congressional purposes un-
derlying the BHCA. The Third30 and Eleventh 31 Circuits held that the
Board has the power to broaden the literal definition of "bank" under the
BHCA to prevent the spread of nonbank banks. The Tenth Circuit,32 in
contrast, held that the BHCA should be read narrowly to limit the
Board's authority to prevent evasions of the Act's purposes. The Tenth
Circuit also considered congressional purposes to be narrower than did
the Third or Eleventh Circuits.
In January 1986, the United States Supreme Court ended the con-
flict among the circuits with its decision in Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp.33 In Dimension,
the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's holding that the Board's
power under the BHCA should be read narrowly and that the "bank"
issue any charters and substantial BHCA issues remained outstanding). In a related action,
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida enjoined the Comptroller
from issuing final charters to nonbank banks on the ground that a nonbank bank is not en-
gaged in the "business of banking" under the National Bank Act. See Independent Bankers
Ass'n of Am. v. Conover, [1985 Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 86,178 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 15, 1985). To date, this injunction is still in effect.
29. See First Bancorporation, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 253 (1982) (holding that negotiable or-
der of withdrawal accounts are "demand deposits" under the BHCA "bank" definition); Deci-
sion of the Comptroller of the Currency to Charter Dreyfus Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., [1982-
1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 99,464, at 86,606 (Feb. 18, 1983) [here-
inafter Dreyfus Decision] (discussing the Board's broad definition of "commercial loan" under
the BHCA); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2 (1984) (broadly defining demand deposits and commercial
loans under the BHCA). The Tenth Circuit set aside the First Bancorporation order and the
new regulation. See infra notes 107-13 & 118-22 and accompanying text.
30. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 668 F.2d 732, 738-
39 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982); see infra notes 91-97 and accompanying
text.
31. Florida Dep't of Banking and Fin. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
760 F.2d 1135, 1143-44 (1 1th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. U.S. Trust Corp. v. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 106 S. Ct. 875 (1986); see infra notes 98-106 and accompany-
ing text.
32. First Bancorporation v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 728 F.2d 434,
438 (10th Cir. 1984); see Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bd., 766 F.2d 1446
(10th Cir. 1985); Dimension Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 744
F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986); infra notes 107-22 and accompanying
text.
33. 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
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definition must be read literally to determine which institutions fall
within the Act.34 The decision is unsatisfactory, however, because the
Court misread the legislative history of the "bank" definition and thus
preserved a loophole that the Board was entitled to close. Even if the
Court had supported the Board's interpretation of the "bank" definition,
many nonbank banks would have continued to escape BHCA regulation,
but the decision further frustrates the congressional purposes in enacting
the BHCA of preventing the mix of commerce and banking and of
preventing interstate banking without state authorization.
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Dimension struck down
the Board's interpretation of the BHCA "bank" definition, it did not end
the uncertainty of the definition. Given this uncertainty and the ease
with which the Act can be evaded, Congress must redefine "bank" under
the BHCA to include all types of institutions that could threaten the
Act's purposes. This Note proposes to redefine "bank" as any institution
that accepts deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion. This redefinition would end the current transaction-based loophole.
Section One of this Note discusses the legislative history of the
BHCA. The Note will show that, as originally proposed in 1956, Con-
gress intended the BHCA only to separate commerce and banking, but
that as amended the Act was also intended to bar interstate banking.
Section One also discusses the legislative history of the "bank" definition.
Section Two discusses prior Board interpretations of the "bank" defini-
tion under the BHCA. The Board originally interpreted the "bank" defi-
nition literally, but as more institutions evaded BHCA regulation, the
Board defined "bank" more liberally. Section Three discusses court of
appeals decisions prior to Dimension that interpreted first, the BHCA
bank definition in light of congressional purposes, and second, the
Board's power to interpret the Act. A split of authority existed on both
issues; the Tenth Circuit generally construed the bank definition and the
Board's authority narrowly, and the Third and Eleventh Circuits inter-
preted these issues broadly. Section Four discusses the Supreme Court's
holding in Dimension, which narrowed both the bank definition and the
scope of the Board's power. Section Four shows that Dimension did not
resolve the judicial confusion over the "bank" definition and the Board's
power under the BHCA. Section Four also discusses the likely conse-
quences of the Court's decision in Dimension and the flaws in the present
regulatory system.
Section Five proposes that Congress resolve the nonbank bank prob-
lem by defining "bank" as any institution that accepts deposits insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This reform would level
the playing field of competition among all commercial banks. This
amendment is necessary before Congress further allows banks to enter
34. Id. at 685-88.
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new product and geographic markets by expanding the powers of bank
holding companies. By amending the definition, Congress may improve
service to consumers while retaining a sound and competitively fair
banking system.
I. Legislative History of the BHCA
A. Competitive Purposes of the BHCA
In 1956, Congress saw several inadequacies in federal banking laws.
Federal regulation reached only a limited number of bank holding com-
panies and expansion by such companies was entirely unregulated.
There was also no limitation on the acquisition of nonbanking
subsidiaries.
35
Congress therefore passed the BHCA with two central competitive
purposes. First, the Act was designed to prevent bank holding compa-
nies from having the unrestrained ability to add to the number of their
banking units and thus to avoid the concentration of commercial bank
facilities under the control and management of a few companies. Second,
the Act was intended to prevent the combination of banking and com-
mercial activities under single control.
36
By fulfilling these two purposes, Congress intended to prevent four
types of anticompetitive abuses that might have occurred before the Act.
First, banks could make unsound lending decisions and could give un-
warranted amounts of credit to nonbank affiliates. Second, banks could
make discriminatory lending decisions against competitors of their non-
banking affiliates. Third, banks could require borrowers to purchase
nonbanking goods and services from their affiliates to obtain credit, thus
increasing their economic power. Fourth, banks could use confidential
information obtained from customers to enable their nonbanking affili-
ates to compete unfairly with these customers. 37
B. Interstate Banking Purposes
Senator Douglas of Illinois added a provision to the bill that pro-
scribed interstate acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies unless
authorized by the state of the acquired bank. 38 This provision became
35. Prior to the enactment of the BHCA, a few holding companies were regulated under
the Banking Act of 1933. However, the Banking Act applied only if(1) a bank subsidiary of a
bank holding company was a member of the Federal Reserve System, and (2) the bank holding
company voted the bank's stock. See 102 CONG. REC. 6,750 (1956) (statement of Sen.
Robertson).
36. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2482, 2483.
37. 115 CONG. REC. 32,894 (1969) (statement of Rep. Patman).
38. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
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known as the "Douglas Amendment. '39 Senator Douglas argued that
this limitation on interstate banking was necessary to "prevent undue
concentration and financial power."''4 Instead, the amendment would
diffuse private control of credit: "[W]hen the credit resources of a coun-
try become concentrated and fall into a few hands, then the industry and
trade of that country also become concentrated." 41 Senator Douglas
considered his amendment to be "in principle almost identical with" and
a "logical continuation" 42 of the principles of the McFadden Act:
[B]y the McFadden Act and other measures, national banks have been
permitted to open branches only to the degree permitted by State laws
and State authorities.
I may say that what our amendment aims to do is to carry over
into the field of holding companies the same provisions which already
apply for branch banking under the McFadden Act-namely our
amendment will permit out-of-state holding companies to acquire
banks only to the degree that State laws expressly permit them; and
that is the provision of the McFadden Act.
4 3
In addition, Senator Douglas intended to give the Federal Reserve
Board final jurisdiction over both intrastate and interstate acquisitions of
banks and bank holding companies. 44 Thus, the Douglas Amendment
incorporated a third purpose into the BHCA of protecting states' rights
to prevent entry by out-of-state holding companies.
C. The "Bank" Definition
The term "bank" has been defined in three different ways since the
BHCA's enactment in 1956. Originally, the BHCA defined "bank" as
any national bank, state bank, savings bank, or trust company, but ex-
cluded foreign banks.
45
In 1963, the Board of Governors faced the issue of whether to inter-
pret this definition to include industrial banks. At that time, "industrial
banks" or "industrial loan companies" were state-chartered institutions
that furnished consumer credit and, in some cases, accepted savings de-
posits. The Board concluded that an industrial bank clearly was not a
national banking association, savings bank, or trust company, but could
39. See Florida Dep't of Banking and Fin. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 760 F.2d 1135, 1137, 1141 (1 1th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. U.S. Trust Corp. v. Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 106 S. Ct. 875 (1986).
40. 102 CONG. REC. 6,857 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 6,860.
43. Id. at 6,858. The McFadden Act is presently codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982). It
defines a "branch" as any place of business "at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or
money lent." Id. § 36(f).
44. 102 CONG. REC. 6,860 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
45. Bank Holding Company Act, ch. 240, § 2(c), 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982)).
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be considered a "State bank" if the institution "engaged in commercial
banking."' 46 The Board concluded that
industrial banks are not within the purview of the term "State bank" as
used in the Act, unless in a particular case, regardless of the title of the
institution or form of the transaction, it accepts deposits subject to
check or otherwise accepts funds from the public that are, in actual
practice, repaid on demand, as are demand or savings deposits held by
commercial banks.47
Thus, prior to 1966, the test of whether an industrial bank fell within the
BHCA "bank" definition was whether the institution accepted either de-
mand deposits or savings deposits that in actual practice were payable on
demand. The Board restated this test in 1965.
48
Industrial bankers objected to this interpretation and, in 1966, lob-
bied for an amendment to the "bank" definition that would specifically
exclude industrial loan companies. 49 Lobbyists argued that such compa-
nies were not engaged in commercial banking because they were not eli-
gible for FDIC insurance, did not accept "checking accounts," and
generally had the right to require ninety days' notice prior to a deposi-
tor's withdrawal of funds from a savings account.50
Upon request from the Senate Banking Committee, Federal Reserve
Board Governor J.L. Robertson commented on this proposal to exclude
industrial banks from the "bank" definition. Governor Robertson sug-
gested that the definition "be amended to cover only 'an institution that
receives deposits payable on demand,' thereby limiting coverage to com-
mercial banks (i.e., banks that offer checking accounts), and excluding
not only industrial banks but other savings banks that accept funds from
the public that are paid on demand. ' 51 Thus, the Board appears to have
acquiesced in industrial bankers' requests that the Act exclude from its
coverage institutions that accept savings deposits but not demand
deposits.
The 1966 amendments to the BHCA defined "bank" as any institu-
tion which "accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to with-
46. Applicability of the Bank Holding Company Act to Industrial Banks, 49 Fed. Res.
Bull. 165, 166 (1963).
47. Id. (emphasis in original).
48. Industrial Banks as "Banks" under the Bank Holding Company Act, 51 Fed. Res.
Bull. 1539, 1540 (1965).
49. Amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956: Hearings on S. 2353, 2418 and H.R.
7371 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
157 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Hearings] (statement of Max A. Denney, Executive Vice Presi-
dent, American Indus. Bankers Ass'n).
50. Id.; see also id. at 394 (letter from Ralph N. Larson, President, The Morris Plan Co.,
to A. Willis Robertson, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency).
51. Id. at 447 (letter from J.L. Robertson, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
to A. Willis Robertson, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency).
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draw on demand."' 52 Senator A. Willis Robertson, chairman of the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, noted that "the [BHCA] was
intended to apply to commercial banks of a sort which might have rela-
tionships with businesses and business firms which should be avoided.
'53
The Senate Report accompanying the amendments stated that the Act's
purposes could be achieved without regulating savings banks or indus-
trial banks because such banks were usually too small to threaten its pur-
poses: "To avoid [regulating companies that control industrial and
savings banks], the bill redefines 'bank' as an institution that accepts de-
posits payable on demand (checking accounts), the commonly accepted
test of whether an institution is a commercial bank . . . ,,14 Congress
chose to define a checking account according to the depositor's "legal
right" to distinguish it from a savings account that, as a matter of prac-
tice, was payable on demand.
In 1970, Congress again revised the "bank" definition by making an
exception for banks that did not make commercial loans. This redefini-
tion was in part a reaction to another major amendment to the BHCA.
Originally, the BHCA regulated only bank holding companies that con-
trolled two or more banks. Congress amended the BHCA in 1970 to
include holding companies that controlled only one bank subsidiary. 55
This amendment was intended to close a "loophole" for one-bank hold-
ing companies.
5 6
Partly in response to this amendment, Senator Edward Brooke of
Massachusetts proposed an exception to the "one-bank" amendment by
changing the BHCA "bank" test: a bank "is engaged in the business of
making commercial loans" and accepts demand deposits.5 7 This amend-
ment apparently benefitted only one bank, Boston Safe and Trust Com-
52. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 3, 80 Stat. 236 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982)).
53. 112 CONG. REC. 12,385 (1966) (statement of Sen. Robertson).
54. S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2385, 2391. It seems clear that Congress chose the "demand deposit" test
because in 1966 commercial banks were the only financial institutions permitted by law to
accept demand deposits. Thus, the BHCA "bank" definition excluded industrial and savings
banks. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326 n.5 (1963).
55. Act of December 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101(a), 84 Stat. 1760 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982)).
56. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5561, 5562 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. 1747].
57. S. 3823, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 22(c), 116 CONG. REc. 14,821 (1970). Although this
bill died in committee, the "commercial loan" language was accepted by the Senate Banking
and Currency Committee and was included in the bill that passed the Senate. See H.R. CONF.
REP. 1747, supra note 56, at 22, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5573. The
conference committee also included the amendment in the final bill. See Act of December 31,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101(c), 84 Stat. 1782 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1981(c)
(1982)); 116 CONG. REC. 42,426 (1970) (comments of Sen. Sparkman); P. HELLER, HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW 10 n.30 (1976).
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pany, a constituent of Senator Brooke's that would have become subject
to the Act because of the 1970 one-bank amendment.58
The "commercial loan" prong may also be seen as a promise ful-
filled by William M. Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board. Congress had also considered amending the BHCA to include
one-bank holding companies in 1966.59 The Boston Company, the hold-
ing company of Boston Safe and Trust, had lobbied to include "commer-
cial banking" language in the 1966 "bank" definition to exclude Boston
Safe from coverage under the BHCA, but ended its efforts after Congress
declined to bring one-bank holding companies within the Act in 1966. In
a letter to the Senate Banking Committee, Chairman Martin noted:
I am impressed by the argument that a bank that does not make com-
mercial loans is not apt to be involved in the kind of abuses the Act is
designed to prevent.... If in the future the Congress should be dis-
posed to adopt the "one-bank" amendment, I would be happy to coop-
erate with you in working out provisions to ensure against coverage of
such a bank.
60
The Senate Banking and Currency Committee Report explained the
1970 amendment to the "bank" definition as follows:
The definition of "bank" adopted by Congress in 1966 was designed to
include commercial banks and exclude those institutions not engaged
in commercial banking, since the purpose of the Act was to restrain
undue concentration of commercial banking resources and to prevent
possible abuses related to the control of commercial credit. However,
the Federal Reserve Board has noted that this definition may be too
broad and may include institutions which are not in fact engaged in the
business of commercial banking in that they do not make commercial
loans. The committee, accordingly, adopted a provision which would
exclude institutions that are not engaged in the business of making
commercial loans from the definition of "bank."
61
Congress understood this amendment as having a very limited im-
pact. In response to an inquiry regarding the new "bank" definition from
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Board Governor J.L. Rob-
ertson replied:
[T]his amendment would have very limited application at present, pos-
sibly affecting only one institution. Since there is less need for concern
about preferential treatment in extending credit where no commercial
loans are involved and in view of the very limited application of this
58. See 116 CONG. Rc. 25,848 (1970) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez, entering into the
record Fowlkes, Financial Report: Bank Lobby Scores in Senate with Second Effort on One-
Bank Holding Bill, 2 NAT'L J. 1530 (1970)).
59. 112 CONG. REc. 12,381 (1966) (statement of Sen. Robertson).
60. Id at 12,386 (Letter from William M. Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, to Senator A. Willis Robertson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency).
61. S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5519, 5541 [hereinafter S. REP. 1084].
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amendment, the Board would have no objection to its adoption. 62
Although the House bill did not include a new "bank" definition,
the House conferees agreed to the change, cautioning that the Board
should construe this exemption narrowly:
It will be seen that [the "commercial loan" exemption] ... appl[ies] to
a very small number of special cases that, it is felt, require special treat-
ment. The Board should interpret th[is] exemption[ ] as narrowly as
possible in order that all bank holding companies which should be cov-
ered under the Act, in order to protect the public interest, will in fact
be covered.
6 3
The BHCA "bank" definition thus evolved from a comprehensive
charter test, encompassing nearly all depository institutions, to a func-
tion-defined test intended to exempt certain institutions from regulation.
In 1966, the "bank" test was based on whether an institution offered
checking accounts. This test exempted industrial and savings banks,
which then lacked the statutory authority to offer checking accounts, be-
cause Congress believed their small size and limited purposes made it
unlikely that they would engage in the anticompetitive abuses that the
BHCA was designed to prevent. In 1970, Congress exempted banks that
did not make commercial loans. The record indicates that Congress also
saw this amendment as a narrow exception for a very few banks that did
not threaten the Act's original purposes. Neither change indicated a pur-
pose to exclude a potentially large number of limited-purpose institutions
or to alter the congressional intent to prevent the mix of commerce and
banking and to allow states to prohibit interstate banking.
II. Federal Reserve Board Interpretations of the BHCA
"Bank" Definition
Section 5(b) of the BHCA authorizes the Federal Reserve Board "to
issue such regulations and orders as may be necessary to enable it to
administer and carry out the purposes of [the BHCA] and prevent eva-
sions thereof."64 After the 1970 BHCA amendments, the Board defined
"bank" under Regulation Y as having the same meaning as under the
Act.65 To supplement this regulation, the Board issued opinions inter-
62. One-Bank Holding Company Legislation of 1970; Hearings on S. 1052, et al, Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 136-37 (1970). In addition
to following Governor Robertson's approval of the changes to the BHCA "bank" definition,
Congress also followed his disapproval of a proposed amendment that would have exempted
certain bank holding companies owning one bank as a part of a commercial conglomerate. See
S. REP. 1084, supra note 61, at 34-39, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5549-54.
63. H.R. CONF. REP. 1747, supra note 56, at 23, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5574.
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982).
65. Regulation Y implements the BHCA. 12 C.F.R. § 225.1(a) (1972). For the current
version of Regulation Y, see id. § 225 (1986).
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preting the "demand deposit" and "commercial loan" prongs of the
"bank" test. Although the Board interpreted these prongs literally dur-
ing the early 1970s, the Board has more recently construed its authority
broadly when defining the "demand deposit" and "commercial loan"
prongs of the BHCA "bank" definition.
A. Demand Deposits
For many years, the "demand deposit" test was self-explanatory be-
cause most banks offered only two types of accounts: checking accounts
and savings accounts. 66 Checking accounts did not pay interest, were
payable to third parties by check, and gave the depositor the legal right
to withdraw funds on demand. 67 Savings accounts paid interest, were
not payable to third parties by check, and reserved to the bank the right
to require advance notice prior to withdrawal. 68 The BHCA "demand
deposit" test was obviously intended to apply to banks that offered
checking accounts.
In 1972, however, Massachusetts and New Hampshire authorized
their state-chartered savings banks to offer negotiable order of with-
drawal ("NOW") accounts, which are essentially interest-bearing check-
ing accounts. 69 Although banks must reserve the right to require
advance notice from NOW account holders prior to withdrawal as they
do with savings accounts, depositors may make third-party payments by
check.70 In many cases, holders of non-interest-bearing checking ac-
counts have shifted to NOW accounts. 71 In 1973, Congress responded to
the NOW account phenomenon by enacting legislation that effectively
prohibited institutions outside of Massachusetts and New Hampshire
from offering NOW accounts. 72 In 1980, however, Congress authorized
banks in every state to offer NOW accounts.
73
66. See United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326 n.5 (1963).
67. Federal Reserve System members were forbidden by law from paying interest on
checking accounts. See 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1982). Congress first allowed interest-bearing
checking accounts on a nationwide basis in 1980.
68. Id. § 371b.
69. G. KAUFMAN, supra note 13, at 422.
70. Id.; see New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 38 N.Y.2d 430, 435, 343 N.E.2d
735, 737, 381 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19 (1975).
71. See Simpson & Williams, Recent Revisions in the Money Stock, 67 Fed. Res. Bull.
539, 542 (1981) (45-55% of funds deposited into NOW accounts opened in early 1981 shifted
from conventional demand deposits).
72, Act of Aug. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-100, § 2, 87 Stat. 342 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 1832 (1982)). Between 1973 and 1980, Congress also permitted NOW accounts on
a statewide basis in Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont, Act of Feb. 27, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-222, 90 Stat. 197, New Jersey, Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-161, 93
Stat. 1235, and New York, Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3712.
73. Act of Mar. 31, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 302(a), 94 Stat. 145 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 371a (1982)).
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Thus, in 1982, the Board faced the issue of whether to classify NOW
accounts as "deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on
demand" under the BHCA "bank" test. The Board held that, although
NOW account holders do not possess a "legal right" to withdraw funds
on demand, NOW accounts should be considered demand deposits under
the bank test because Congress was concerned with the "substance rather
than the form of the deposit."'74 In 1984, the Board codified this ruling
when it revised Regulation y.75 Under the revised regulation, "deposits
that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand" meant "any
deposit with transactional capability that as a matter of practice is paya-
ble on demand and that the depositor may withdraw by check, draft,
negotiable order of withdrawal, or other similar instrument for payment
to third parties."
'76
This extension of the "demand deposit" prong of the BHCA "bank"
definition was significant because it represented an attempt by the Board
to equate the BHCA bank test with banks' new powers-powers banks
did not have in 1966 when the definition was enacted. The new regula-
tion expanded the Board's jurisdiction by including any financial institu-
tion-other than a savings and loan-that made commercial loans and
offered some type of transaction account, such as a NOW account.
Thus, the Board attempted to prevent nonbank banks from using their
newly acquired powers to evade BHCA regulation, a use of those powers
that the Board viewed as an unintended result of congressional authori-
zation of NOW accounts.
77
B. -Commercial Loans
Of the two prongs of the "bank" test, the commercial loan prong
has received greater scrutiny. Since 1970, the Board's staff has issued
numerous letters interpreting the phrase "engages in the business of mak-
ing commercial loans."' 78 Prior to 1980, these opinions generally held
that short-term money market transactions, such as the purchase of com-
74. First Bancorporation, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 253, 253-54 (1982) (citing Wilshire Oil Co.
v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 668 F.2d 732, 736-37 (3d Cir. 1981)).
75. 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1984). The Tenth Circuit subsequently set aside this new regulation
in Dimension Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 744 F.2d 1402, 1411
(10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 681, 684 (1986). See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying
text.
76. 49 Fed. Reg. 836 (1984) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(b) (1986)).
77. See id. at 833-42 (Board justification for expanded demand deposit definition).
78. See, e.g., Dreyfus Decision, supra note 29, 86,609 (summarizing an unpublished let-
ter from Michael A. Greenspan, Assistant Secretary, Federal Reserve Board, to Lee J. Aubrey,
Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (May 18, 1972), which advised that Boston
Safe and Trust's short-term money market transactions did not constitute engaging in the
"business of making commercial loans" under the BHCA "bank" test, and an unpublished
letter from Baldwin B. Tuttle, Deputy General Counsel, Federal Reserve Board, to Michael A.
Greenspan (January 26, 1976), which advised that money market transactions such as com-
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mercial paper,79 the sale of federal funds, 80 banker's acceptances, 81 and
broker call loans82 were not "commercial loans" under the "bank" test.
83
The Board distinguished these indirect money market transactions from
traditional commercial loans 84 because a direct commercial lender may
exert more economic power over the borrower than an indirect lender,
which acts as an investor in money market securities through an
intermediary.
85
Later Board interpretations changed this position. In a letter to
Chrysler Corporation regarding a Chrysler nonbank bank subsidiary, the
Board warned that the institution could become a "bank" under the
BHCA if, in addition to accepting demand deposits, it invested in com-
mercial paper and banker's acceptances, because those instruments
"could substitute for commercial loans."' 86 In a December 1982 Board
ruling disapproving the purchase of a nonbank bank by Dreyfus Corpo-
ration, the Board stated that "commercial loan" under the BHCA
"bank" test included such money market transactions as the purchase of
commercial paper, banker's acceptances and certificates of deposit, the
extension of broker call loans, the sale of federal funds, the deposit of
interest-bearing funds, and "similar lending vehicles." T87 The FDIC and
mercial paper, banker's acceptances, and call loans do not have the necessary close lender-
borrower relationship to constitute "commercial loans" under the BHCA "bank" definition).
79. In this context, commercial paper is an unsecured promissory note of a large, nation-
ally known corporation, with an initial maturity of less than 270 days and in a minimum
denomination of $25,000. Firms sell commercial paper either directly or through dealers as a
substitute for short-term bank loans. This mode of borrwing is advantageous to commercial
firms because they may avoid the minimum compensating deposit balance required by banks
on most traditional commercial loans agreements, and thus pay a lower effective interest rate
on their debt. G. KAUFMAN, supra note 13, at 60.
80. "Federal funds" are reserve balances that depository institutions, primarily commer-
cial banks, have on deposit at the Federal Reserve Bank in their district. If a bank has reserves
over the legally required minimum, it may lend the excess amount overnight to other institu-
tions that have deficient legal reserves so that they may comply with the minimum require-
ment. Lending this excess amount is referred to as "selling" federal funds. Id. at 59-60.
81. Banker's acceptances are short-term credit instruments used by firms engaged in in-
ternational trade. A banker's acceptance is a draft on a commercial bank, generally payable to
the exporter of goods, based on funds that will be deposited at the bank by the corresponding
importer within a certain time period. The draft is secured by the goods traded and guarantees
the exporter payment for its goods. Id. at 60-61.
82. A call loan is a loan that the lender may require the borrower to repay at any time,
usually on 24 hours' notice. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 185 (5th ed. 1979).
83. See 49 Fed. Reg. 833-42 (1984) (explanation of revisions to Regulation Y); supra note
78.
84. Traditionally, "commercial loans" referred to short-term working capital loans.
Schweitzer, Banks and Banking-A Review of a Definition, 94 BANKING L.J. 6 (1977).
85. See P. HELLER, supra note 57, at 10-11.
86. Letter from the Federal Reserve Board to the Chrysler Corporation (May 28, 1981),
reprinted in [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCII) 98,770.
87. Dreyfus Decision, supra note 29, 86,608; see also Citizens Fidelity Corp., 69 Fed.
Res. Bull. 556, 557 (1983).
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the Comptroller of the Currency criticized this ruling as "dramatically
recast[ing] the definition of commercial loan by including within it cer-
tain activities that clearly had been excluded from the definition in the
past.... [W]e believe such a radical departure from the traditional view
of what constitutes a commercial loan raises issues beyond the scope of
regulatory interpretation." 88 Nevertheless, on January 5, 1984, the Board
codified its Dreyfus ruling in a broad definition of commercial loans in its
revisions to Regulation Y.89
The new commercial loan definition, like the new demand deposit
definition, was an attempt by the Board to expand its jurisdiction over
nonbank banks which previously had avoided BHCA regulation. Unlike
the new demand deposit test, however, this new definition of commercial
loans could not be justified by pointing to the expanded powers of banks.
In 1984, banks enjoyed many of the same commercial lending powers
they had enjoyed in 1970, when the commercial loan prong was added to
the "bank" test. Thus, this redefinition altered the traditional notion of
commercial loans simply to expand the Board's jurisdiction over "loop-
hole" banks.
III. Court Decisions Under the BHCA
The controversy over Board orders and regulations concerning non-
bank banks extended into federal appellate courts. Private parties on
both sides of the nonbank bank debate challenged Board actions. Prior
to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Finan-
cial Corp.,90 federal courts disagreed about the proper interpretation of
the BHCA "bank" definition in light of the Act's legislative history and
congressional purposes, and they also disagreed about the scope of the
Board's authority to enforce provisions of the BHCA. While the Tenth
Circuit narrowly interpreted the BHCA "bank" definition and the
Board's administrative power to enforce the Act's purposes, the Third
and Eleventh Circuits generally interpreted the "bank" definition
broadly and gave substantial deference to the Board's actions under the
Act. In Dimension, the Supreme Court ended the -split among the cir-
cuits when it held that the "bank" definition should be read literally and,
88. Dreyfus Decision, supra note 29, 1 86,608 n.1.
89. 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1986). Section 225.2(b) stated:
"[Commercial loans" means any loan other than a loan to an individual for per-
sonal, family, household, or charitable purposes, and includes the purchase of retail
installment loans or commercial paper, certificates of deposit, banker's acceptances,
and similar money market instruments, the extension of broker call loans, the sale of
federal funds, and the deposit of interest-bearing funds.
Id. § 225.2(b). The Tenth Circuit set aside this new regulation in Dimension Fin. Corp. v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 744 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct.
681 (1986); see infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
90. 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986); see infra notes 123-39 and accompanying text.
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contrary to its earlier decisions, held that the Board has limited power to
interpret this definition.
A. The Third and Eleventh Circuits' Broad Construction of the BHCA
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Dimension, the Third and
Eleventh Circuits had read the BHCA "bank" definition broadly to bring
nonbank banks within the Act. In Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System,91 the Board ruled that Wilshire violated
the BHCA by engaging in impermissible nonbanking activities-the pro-
duction and refinement of oil and gas. It ordered the Texas bank holding
company either to divest itself of its oil and gas operations or to divest
itself of its New Jersey banking subsidiary, Trust Company of New
Jersey ("TCNJ").
92
Wilshire attempted to place itself outside the Board's jurisdiction by
converting TCNJ into a nonbank bank. TCNJ notified its demand de-
positors that it was reserving the right to require fourteen days' notice
prior to withdrawal, but indicated that it never intended to exercise this
right. Wilshire argued that because TCNJ's depositors no longer held a
"legal right to withdraw on demand," TCNJ was no longer a "bank" for
BHCA purposes.93 The Board rejected this argument and ordered
divestment.
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the Board's order and held
that the Board should look to the purposes of the BHCA rather than to
its literal terms when literalism would lead to "absurd or futile results,"
or merely an unreasonable result "plainly at variance with the policy of
legislation as a whole."' 94 The Third Circuit held that the "demand de-
posit" test was satisfied by the depositor's ability in practice to withdraw
on demand rather than the depositor's legal right to withdraw on de-
mand.95 The court also held that the Board has broad regulatory power
under section 5(b) of the BHCA to prevent evasions of the Act.96 The
Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. 97
Prior to Dimension, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the BHCA
91. 668 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982).
92. Id. at 773; see 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(d), 1843(a) (1982).
93. Wilshire, 668 F.2d at 734.
94. Id. at 736 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940)).
95. Id. at 737.
96. Id. at 736 ("the construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is
entitled to substantial deference" (citing United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553
(1979))); id. at 738 n.13 ("Congress enacted § 5(b) [12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982), which gives
the Board the power to issue regulations and orders to prevent evasions of the Act] as a catch-
all, to cover any other evasions attempted through activity conforming to the letter, but not the
spirit, of the statute.").
97. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 457 U.S. 1132
(1982).
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"bank" definition even more liberally than the Third Circuit. Many con-
sidered Florida Department of Banking and Finance v. Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System 98 to be a landmark case foreclosing
the possibility of future nonbank banks.99 U.S. Trust, a New York bank
holding company, applied for Board approval under section 4(c)(8) of
the Act'0° to expand the activities of its nonbanking subsidiary in Flor-
ida. The proposed expansion would include the acceptance of demand
deposits and the making of commercial loans. The Board approved the
expansion subject to the conditions that the subsidiary would neither
make commercial loans nor engage in commercial transactions with any
U.S. Trust affiliate. 101
The Florida Department of Banking and the Florida Bankers Asso-
ciation appealed this decision to the Eleventh Circuit. The court re-
versed the Board's order, holding that Board approval of the acquisition
of a nonbank bank by an out-of-state bank holding company violated the
spirit of the BHCA. The court recognized Congress' two original pro-
competitive purposes in enacting the BHCA: (1) to prevent the concen-
tration of control over banking facilities; and (2) to prevent the combina-
tion under single control of banking and commercial enterprises, which
would permit bank holding companies to use bank deposits to finance
unrelated nonbanking activities. The court also recognized Senator
Douglas' purpose of "prohibit[ing] the creation of interstate deposit-tak-
ing networks by bank holding companies without specific state
authorization."1 0 2
Although the U.S. Trust subsidiary did not meet the "commercial
loan" prong of the BHCA "bank" test, the court held that it was none-
theless a "bank" for BHCA purposes with respect to the Douglas
Amendment. 0 3 The court refused to "employ literalism in statutory in-
terpretation," reasoning that the "commercial loan" prong was nothing
more than a "technical amendment of a definition of a bank" designed to
exempt one institution-Boston Safe and Trust Co. To interpret the
"bank" definition literally would be "a total emasculation of the long
held policy giving states control over bank expansion."' 1
The court also held that the Board has broad power under the
BHCA to prevent evasions of the Act's purposes. The Eleventh Circuit
concluded: "The Board is Congress' custodian of the Act. In that capac-
98. 760 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. U.S. Trust Corp. v. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 106 S. Ct. 875 (1986).
99. See, eg., 44 WASH. FIN. REP. 918 (1985); Fraust, Court Ruling Endangers Nonbank
Banks, AM. BANKER, May 28, 1985.
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
101. Florida Dep't of Banking, 760 F.2d at 1137-38.
102. Id. at 1141.
103. Id. at 1142; see supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
104. Florida Dep't of Banking, 760 F.2d at 1141.
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ity, it is charged with insuring compliance with Congress' goals even
when Congress muddies the waters." 10 5 The Florida Department of
Banking holding was especially remarkable because the court held that
the Board had such power under the Act that it could ignore statutory
language if the language appeared to be in conflict with the purposes of
the Act as a whole. The court held that, for the purposes of the Douglas
Amendment, the Board should have used this power to consider a de-
posit-taking institution to be a "bank" under the Act even if it did not
make commercial loans.106
Thus, prior to Dimension, the Third and Eleventh Circuits generally
did not read the BHCA "bank" definition literally when doing so would
defeat the purposes of the Act: preventing the mix of commerce and
banking and maintaining state control over interstate banking. Instead,
the courts held that if an institution was not technically a "bank" under
the BHCA, the Board should use its broad administrative authority to
subject the institution to BHCA regulation.
B. The Tenth Circuit's Narrow Construction of the BHCA
Unlike the Third and Eleventh Circuits, the Tenth Circuit had read
the BHCA "bank" definition literally in determining which institutions
fall under the Act's coverage. In First Bancorporation v. Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, 10 7 First Bancorporation, a Utah bank
holding company, applied for Board approval under section 4(c)(8) of
the BHCA108 for the acquisition of Beehive Financial Corp., an indus-
trial loan company 0 9 that accepted NOW accounts and made commer-
cial loans. The Board approved First Bancorporation's acquisition of
Beehive, but prohibited the loan company from making commercial
loans and offering NOW accounts. The Board stated that allowing Bee-
hive to engage in both activities would qualify it as a "bank" under the
BHCA, thereby making it an improper nonbanking subsidiary under sec-
tion 4(c)(8). At the same time, the Board sought to apply the same re-
strictions to Foothill Thrift & Loan, another First Bancorporation
industrial loan company subsidiary. First Bancorporation protested, ar-
guing that NOW accounts were not "deposits that the depositor has a
legal right to withdraw on demand," because Utah law required indus-
105. Id. at 1143-44.
106. Id.
107. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
108. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
109. Traditionally, industrial loan companies, or industrial banks, were small, uninsured
state-chartered institutions that made small to medium-sized installment loans to households.
In recent years, however, states have expanded the powers of industrial banks to allow them to
insure their deposits through the FDIC and to make commercial loans. See Oklahoma Bank-
ers Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bd., 766 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (10th Cir. 1985); G. KAUFMAN,
supra note 13, at 205-06.
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trial loan companies to reserve the right to require advance notice prior
to withdrawal from NOW accounts.
110
The Tenth Circuit agreed with First Bancorporation, holding that
the legislative history of the BHCA precluded categorizing NOW ac-
counts as "demand deposits." The court noted that in 1966, when Con-
gress amended the "bank" definition, it rejected the Board's suggestion
that the definition include any institution that accepts deposits that, as a
matter of practice, are payable on demand; instead, Congress chose to
use "legal right" language. Thus, the court reasoned, Congress clearly
intended to exclude all accounts that the depositor does not possess a
legal right to withdraw on demand, including NOW accounts.1
The court also distinguished the NOW accounts offered by Beehive
and Foothill from the transaction accounts offered by TCNJ in Wilshire.
In Wilshire, the banking subsidiary's legal right to require advance notice
prior to withdrawal was created by contract to evade coverage under the
Act, while Beehive's and Foothill's legal rights to require advance notice
were required by Utah law. Thus, Beehive and Foothill accounts could
not be viewed as attempts to evade the Act. 1 2
The court also held that the Board had narrow authority to inter-
pret the "bank" definition. The court held that in determining that
NOW accounts constituted demand deposits within the meaning of the
bank definition, "the Board abused its discretion by improperly attempt-
ing to propose legislative policy by an adjudicative order." 113
A subsequent Tenth Circuit case dealing with the "demand deposit"
prong of the BHCA bank definition blurred this distinction between the
source of the withdrawal restriction-contract versus statute-and ad-
ded confusion to the proper interpretation of the demand deposit prong.
In Oklahoma Bankers Association v. Federal Reserve Board,114 the Bank-
ers Association protested the Board's approval of Citicorp's acquisition
of an Oklahoma consumer finance company. The company proposed to
make commercial loans and accept time deposits that were not payable
by check to third parties. An agreement with the depositors reserved to
the company the right to require advance notice prior to withdrawal
from the time deposit accounts. 115
The Bankers Association argued that by performing these activities,
the company would qualify as a "bank" under the BHCA and thus Cit-
icorp (a New York bank holding company) would be barred from acquir-
ing the Oklahoma institution by the Douglas Amendment. The Board,
110. First Bancorporation, 728 F.2d at 435-36.
111. Id. at 436-37; see supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
112. First Bancorporation, 728 F.2d at 436.
113. Id. at 438.
114. 766 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1985).
115. Id. at 1449.
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however, approved the acquisition because the time deposits did not
function as "demand deposits," that is, they were not payable to third
parties on demand.
116
The Tenth Circuit could have simply affirmed the Board's reasoning
that a time deposit account did not function as a checking account and
thus did not meet the demand deposit prong of the "bank" definition.
Instead, however, the court chose to focus on the depositor's "legal
right" to make withdrawals on demand. Noting that the "source of the
[withdrawal] restriction" in this case differed from that in First Bancor-
poration, the court held that "[t]his difference, state regulation versus pri-
vate contractual agreement, does not change the depositors' basic legal
status." The court then concluded that the institution's actual banking
practice is irrelevant in determining whether the account is a "demand
deposit" under the BHCA "bank" test; rather, only the depositor's "legal
right" is determinative. Nevertheless, the court qualified its holding by
adding: "Should a subsidiary classified as a nonbank under the Act alter
its deposit-taking practice so as to violate the Act the Board may order
that institution to cease and desist from such practices.",
1 7
Just as the First Bancorporation court had destroyed the Board's
new interpretation of "demand deposit," Dimension Financial Corp. v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 118 dispensed with the
Board's broad definition of "commercial loan." Dimension Financial
Corporation and others petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review the new
definition of the commercial loan and demand deposit elements of the
BHCA "bank" definition under Regulation Y. After stating that it en-
dorsed the district court's rejection of the new demand deposit definition
in First Bancorporation, the Tenth Circuit considered the new commer-
cial loan definition. 1 9 The court concluded that the Board's new defini-
tion did not resemble the commonly accepted meaning of the term either
in 1970 or at the present; the court accordingly set the Board's definition
aside. 12
0
The court maintained that Congress intended to permit the develop-
ment of nonbank banks, and thus the operation of such banks could not
be considered "evasions" of the Act that the Board has authority to pre-
vent under section 5(b).121 The court also held that the Board has nar-
row authority to interpret the "bank" definition: "The authority of the
Board under the Act is to be exercised in a restricted area. It does not
have the broad scope to work in as do many other agencies.... Instead
the BHCA limits the subject matter of the Board's functions basically to
116. Id.; see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
117. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449-50.
118. 744 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
119. Id. at 1404.
120. Id. at 1405, 1411.
121. Id. at 1407-08; see 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982).
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anticompetitive considerations." 122
In sum, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dimension, federal
circuit courts had taken two conflicting positions regarding the BHCA
"bank" definition and the scope of the Board's authority to interpret the
Act. The Tenth Circuit construed the "bank" definition literally, al-
lowing nonbank banks to exist outside the Board's jurisdiction under the
BHCA. The Tenth Circuit also held that the Board has narrow author-
ity to interpret the "bank" definition to regulate nonbank banks regard-
less of whether regulation would advance the Act's purposes. The Third
and Eleventh Circuits held that the "bank" definition should not be read
literally in the light of Congress's original purposes under the BHCA,
and that the Board has broad authority to prevent evasions of the Act.
IV. Analysis and Consequences of Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp.
A. The Supreme Court's Ruling in Dimension
The Supreme Court ended the split among the federal courts of ap-
peals over the proper interpretation of the BHCA "bank" definition in
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial
Corp.123 The Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's holding that the "bank"
definition must be read narrowly in the light of the Act's purposes. The
Court also held that the Board's power to interpret the "bank" definition
is limited by the literal language of the BHCA. 124 One week later, the
Supreme Court vacated Florida Department of Banking and Finance v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 125 and remanded the
case to the Eleventh Circuit for review in the light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Dimension.
(1) "Bank" Definition
After briefly reviewing the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Supreme
Court analyzed the legislative history of the BHCA. The Court stated
that Congress amended the "bank" definition in 1966 because
"[e]xperience soon proved that literal application of the statute had the
unintended consequence of including within regulation industrial banks
offering limited checking account services to their customers [that were]
.. 'in actual practice, repaid on demand.' ",126 The Court stated that the
122. Dimension, 744 F.2d at 1408.
123. 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
124. Id. at 684.
125. 760 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. U.S. Trust Corp. v. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 106 S. Ct. 875 (1986); see supra notes 98-106 and accompany-
ing text.
126. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 684 (quoting letter from J.L. Robertson, Governor, Fed.
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Board at that time saw no policy reason to regulate industrial banks
under the BHCA. Congress agreed and accordingly amended the "bank"
definition to limit the Act's application to institutions that accept "depos-
its that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand."' 27 The
Court then stated that Congress again amended the "bank" definition in
1970 because the 1966 "bank" definition "included... institutions that
did not pose significant dangers to the banking system. Because one of
the primary purposes of the Act was to 'restrain undue concentration of
... commercial credit,' it made little sense to regulate institutions that
did not, in fact, engage in the business of making commercial loans."'128
Next, the Court acknowledged that the Board found that nonbank
banks pose three dangers to the banking system. First, nonbank banks
have a significant competitive advantage over regulated banks despite the
functional equivalence of the services offered. Second, nonbank banks
threaten the regulatory structure limiting the mix of commerce and
banking. Third, nonbank banks undermine the federal proscription on
interstate banking under the Douglas Amendment and the McFadden
Act. 129
The Court then analyzed the two elements of the "bank" definition.
The Court first struck down the Board's interpretation of the "demand
deposit" prong under the "bank" definition. Although it acknowledged
that NOW accounts function similarly to traditional checking accounts,
the Court did not look beyond the language of the Act. Because NOW
account holders do not possess a "legal right" to withdraw funds on de-
mand, the Court ruled that the Board could not bring NOW accounts
within the demand deposit prong of the "bank" definition. Arguing that
it "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,"
the Court stated that
no amount of agency expertise-however sound may be the result-
can make the words "legal right" mean a right to do something "as a
matter of practice." A legal right to withdraw means just that: a right
to withdraw deposits without prior notice or limitation. Institutions
offering NOW accounts do not give the depositor a legal right to with-
draw on demand. 130
The Court then turned to the Board's "commercial loan" definition.
The Court held that money market transactions, including commercial
paper, do not fall within the commonly accepted definition of "commer-
cial loan"-a "direct loan from a bank to a business customer for the
Reserve Bd., to A. Willis Robertson, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
reprinted in 1966 Hearings, supra note 49, at 447).
127. Id. at 684-85 (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 685 (quoting S. REP. 1084, supra note 61, at 24).
129. Id. at 685.
130. Id. at 685-86 (emphasis in original).
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purpose of providing funds needed by the customer in its business."13'
The Court cited earlier Board orders and letters that excluded money
market transactions from the commercial loan prong. As late as 1981,
the Board specifically excluded federal fuids and other money market
instruments from the commercial loan prong, although the instruments
were considered commercial loans for other regulatory purposes.
132
The Court rejected the Board's argument that the commercial loan
prong was intended to benefit only Boston Safe and Trust Company or a
few banks like it,133 for two reasons. First, the statute by its terms, as
well as the Senate Report, exempts all institutions not engaged in com-
mercial lending; neither the statute nor the Report refer to Boston Safe.
Second, Boston Safe itself was engaging in money market transactions in
1970. Thus, even assuming that the amendment was intended to benefit
only Boston Safe, Congress could not have intended the commercial loan
prong to include money market transactions. Otherwise, Boston Safe
would not have been exempted.'
34
(2) Board Power to Administer the BHCA
In addition to narrowing the BHCA "bank" definition, the Dimen-
sion holding appears to restrict the Board's power to implement the Act.
The Court held that the BHCA "vests broad regulatory authority in the
Board over bank holding companies" to carry out the Act's purposes,
but that "[t]he breadth of that regulatory power rests on the Act's defini-
tion of the word 'bank.' "135 In determining the Board's authority to
interpret the "bank" definition, the Court concluded: "If the statute is
clear and unambiguous 'that is the end of the matter .... 136
The Court also held that the Board lacked the power to regulate
nonbank banks based on the "plain purpose" doctrine, which states that
a court should go beyond literal statutory language if reliance on that
language would defeat the statute's plain purpose. 137 The Court stated
that the "plain purpose" of legislation is first determined by the plain
language of the statute itself: "Congress defined with specificity certain
transactions that constitute banking subject to regulation. The [BHCA]
may be imperfect, but the Board has no power to correct flaws that it
perceives in the statute it is empowered to administer."'138
131. Id.
132. Id. at 687; see supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
134. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 687-88.
135. Id. at 684.
136. Id. at 686 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National [sic] Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
137. Id. at 688-89; see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983); United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940).
138. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 688-89.
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The Court concluded by stating that bank regulatory reform must
be accomplished by Congress, and not by the Board or the courts:
Without doubt there is much to be said for regulating financial institu-
tions that are the functional equivalent of banks.... If the Bank Hold-
ing Company [Act] falls short of providing safeguards desirable or
necessary to protect the public interest, that is a problem for Congress,
and not the Board or the courts, to address. 139
B. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Decision in Dimension
In Dimension, the Supreme Court construed the BHCA "bank" def-
inition literally. The Court reasoned that the clear language of the stat-
ute plainly embodied the congressional intent behind the Act and made
judicial interpretation unnecessary. The Court correctly applied this ra-
tionale in rejecting the Board's interpretation of the "commercial loan"
prong, because the statute and its legislative history clearly show that
Congress intended to exclude "money market" transactions from the
Act. The Court's literal interpretation of the "demand deposit" prong,
in contrast, encourages the absurd result of allowing any bank to escape
regulation under the Act simply by inserting a "prior notice" clause in all
its checking account contracts. The Court's decision also leaves open the
question of the Board's future authority to interpret the BHCA. Clearly,
Dimension dealt the Board a severe blow in its efforts to regulate non-
bank banks. However, the decision could have far greater effects.
(1) Demand Deposit
In Dimension, the Supreme Court concluded that the "demand de-
posit" prong of the "bank" test was not intended to include NOW ac-
counts because NOW account holders do not possess a "legal right" to
withdraw funds on demand, as required by the statute.140 The Court's
decision is flawed for two reasons. First, the Court misread the legisla-
tive history of the 1966 amendment to the "bank" definition and then
incorrectly concluded that industrial banks, which were exempted from
the Act, offered checking accounts. Second, the decision leads to absurd
results. This decision defeats the Act's purposes by exempting any insti-
tution that offers checking accounts that function identically to tradi-
tional checking accounts but that have meaningless "prior notice"
clauses.
In addressing the legislative history of the 1966 "bank" definition,
the Court noted that, prior to 1966, "industrial banks offer[ed] limited
checking account services to their customers [that were] . . . 'in actual
practice, repaid on demand.' "141 in support of this assertion, the Court
139. Id. at 689.
140. Id. at 686.
141. Id. at 684 (quoting letter from J.L. Robertson, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., to A.
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partially quoted a letter to the Senate Banking Committee from Gover-
nor J.L. Robertson of the Federal Reserve Board. The Court relied on
this letter to conclude that Congress intended to exempt banks which
offer checking accounts that are, in practice, repaid on demand, but do
not give the depositor a legal right to withdraw funds on demand. Thus,
the argument goes, Congress clearly did not intend NOW accounts to fall
within the "demand deposit" definition.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the legislative history is erroneous
for two reasons. First, Governor Robertson did not state that industrial
banks offered "limited checking account services." Indeed, the letter
states that the 1966 amendment was intended to limit coverage to "com-
mercial banks (Le. banks that offer checking accounts), and exclud[e] not
only industrial banks but other savings banks that accept funds from the
public that are repaid on demand."142 Thus, Congress intended to regu-
late all institutions that offered checking accounts.
43
Second, industrial banks were not even empowered to offer checking
accounts in 1966. A few industrial banks offered nontransaction savings
accounts that, as a matter of practice, were payable on demand to the
depositor, but were not subject to check.144 Thus, the legislative history
clearly shows that the "legal right" language was used to distinguish
checking accounts from savings accounts. Congress intended that banks
offering checking accounts were to be subject to the Act.
The Supreme Court's misinterpretation of the "demand deposit"
prong also leads to absurd results that defeat the plain purpose of the
Act. Although the Court acknowledged that judicial interpretation
should go beyond the literal language of a statute if literalism would lead
to an "absurd result" or would defeat the "plain purpose" of the stat-
ute,145 the decision in Dimension prevents neither of these evils.
First, the decision leads to an absurd result. Under the Court's rul-
ing, a bank may avoid BHCA regulation by offering only NOW accounts
and not offering any traditional checking accounts that give the depositor
a "legal right" to withdraw funds on demand. Alternatively, a bank may
simply add a never-exercised "prior notice" clause to all its traditional
checking account agreements. 146 The result is absurd in either event. A
bank may escape regulation under the BHCA without sacrificing any
Willis Robertson, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency); see supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
142. 1966 Hearings, supra note 49, at 447 (emphasis added).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
144. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
145. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 688-89; see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
586 (1983); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940); Brown v.
Duchesne, 61 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1857).
146. It is unclear whether a bank may evade the demand deposit prong by inserting a prior
notice clause in its checking account contracts, in defiance of the Third Circuit's earlier hold-
[V ol. 38
services that a BHCA-regulated bank may offer. The Court's ruling al-
lows the Act to be so easily evaded that it may eventually only regulate
those institutions that would not benefit from avoiding its coverage.
Second, the decision defeats the plain purpose of the "demand de-
posit" prong: to regulate banks that offer checking accounts. The deci-
sion ignores the practical similarities between NOW accounts and
traditional demand deposit accounts. Both types of accounts allow the
holder to withdraw funds by means of a demand draft payable to third
parties; both must meet the same reserve requirements. 147 Further, the
BHCA "demand deposit" test was enacted before any domestic bank of-
fered NOW accounts. 148 Although NOW account holders do not actu-
ally possess a "legal right" to withdraw funds on demand, many NOW
account holders consider such accounts to be the functional equivalent of
conventional demand deposits and have replaced their non-interest-bear-
ing checking accounts with NOW accounts. 149 Thus, by offering NOW
accounts and making commercial loans, nonbank banks may be the func-
tional equivalent of commercial banks, yet escape the BHCA regulation
which conventional banks must face.
(2) Commercial Loans
The Supreme Court also struck down the Board's broad interpreta-
tion of the "commercial loan" prong of the "bank" definition. 150 The
Court properly rejected the Board's commercial loan interpretation be-
cause the Board defied both the legislative history of the prong and the
purpose behind its enactment.
The BHCA's legislative history clearly shows that Congress did not
intend to include money market transactions within the "commercial
loan" prong. First, had Congress wished to include extensions of credit
other than traditional commercial loans within this prong, it probably
would have included such transactions in the language of the statute, or
at least indicated in its committee report that it intended to include all
types of commercial credit within the definition. Because Congress gave
no indication that it intended anything other than the traditional notion
of commercial loans-that is, loans involving a direct lender-borrower
ing in Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 668 F.2d 732, 737 (3d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982). See infra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 52 & 74 and accompanying text. The Court's refusal to include
NOW accounts in the earlier adopted "demand deposit" test contradicts the premise that
courts should emphasize congressional objectives when overlapping legislation is enacted
piecemeal, rather than emphasizing the individual steps themselves. See Otero Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 665 F.2d 279, 289-90 (10th Cir. 1981) (McKay, J.,
concurring).
149. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
150. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 688.
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relationship-a court is safe to assume that the language may be inter-
preted literally. Moreover, prior to 1980 the Board itself interpreted this
prong according to its ordinarily accepted meaning.
Second, even if the 1970 amendment resulted from the Boston Com-
pany's efforts to exempt its subsidiary, Boston Safe, from the BHCA, as
the record suggests,151 the prong would still have to be interpreted to
exclude money market transactions. In 1970, Boston Safe engaged in
money market transactions but did not engage in traditional lending.
Thus, if Senator Brooke introduced the amendment with the intent to
exclude his constituent, Boston Safe, he clearly intended to exclude
money market transactions from the "commercial loan" prong.
The Court also properly set aside the Board's interpretation of the
"commercial loan" prong because the interpretation defied the policy be-
hind the 1970 amendment. One of Congress' primary purposes in pass-
ing the BHCA was to prevent commercial banks from making unsound
loans to commercial affiliates. 152 The Board's sweeping "commercial
loan" interpretation included many types of "money market" transac-
tions, such as broker call loans, certificates of deposit, and commercial
paper.153 Such transactions are normally conducted through a secondary
market and are merely passive investments for idle funds.1 54 Because
these transactions occur in the open market and are short-term in nature,
they pose less of a risk that a bank would make an unsound decision
jeopardizing the safety and soundness of the banking system. Further,
"consumer banks" that only accept demand deposits, make noncommer-
cial loans, and. engage in passive secondary investments are less likely
than traditional commercial banks to grow to a size that would create
anticompetitive conditions. Thus, such institutions do not threaten the
procompetitive purpose of the BHCA and should not be subject to
BHCA regulation.
(3) Board Authority Under the BHCA
The Supreme Court's decision in Dimension substantially reduced
the extent to which the Board may interpret the BHCA "bank" defini-
tion to carry out congressional intent. The Court held that the BHCA
"vests broad regulatory authority in the Board over bank holding compa-
nies" to carry out the purposes of the Act, but that "[tihe breadth of that
regulatory power rests on the Act's definition of the word 'bank.' "155
Clearly this decision substantially restricts the scope of the Board's au-
thority to interpret the "bank" definition. It is less clear, however,
151. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
154. See 49 Fed. Reg. 839 (1984); see also P. HELLER, supra note 57, at 10-11.
155. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 684.
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whether this decision could restrict the Board's authority to interpret
other sections of the Act.
Prior to Dimension, most federal courts held that the Federal Re-
serve Board has broad authority to interpret the BHCA. In Securities
Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem 156 and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. First Lin-
colnwood Corp.,157 the Supreme Court held that federal courts must defer
to Board interpretations of the BHCA that arguably promote its congres-
sional purposes, particularly when Congress has remained silent in the
face of Board decisions.
In Securities Industry, the petitioners challenged a Board order al-
lowing a bank holding company to sell retail securities, arguing that the
Board did not have the authority under the BHCA to permit this activ-
ity. The case involved section 4(c)(8) of the Act, which states that a bank
holding company may acquire the shares of a nonbank company the ac-
tivities of which the Board has determined to be "closely related to bank-
ing." 158 The Court affirmed the Board's order, holding that the Board
has broad power under the Act to determine what activities are "closely
related to banking."' 159 Noting that "Congress has committed to the
Board the primary responsibility for administering the [BHCA]," the
Court held that Board decisions are " 'entitled to the greatest de-
ference.' "160
In First Lincolnwood, the petitioners protested a Board order that
withheld approval to form a bank holding company because it was un-
dercapitalized. 16' The Supreme Court held that the Board's interpreta-
tions of the Act are "entitled to great respect, 'especially where Congress
has refused to alter its administrative construction.' "162
Given these prior decisions, Dimension may be interpreted in two
ways regarding the extent of the Board's authority to interpret the Act.
Because Securities Industry and First Lincolnwood involved sections of
the Act that delegate policy-making authority to the Board, the decision
in Dimension may only restrict the Board's interpretations of the "bank"
156. 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
157. 439 U.S. 234 (1978).
158. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
159. Securities Indus., 468 U.S. at 215.
160. Id. at 215-16 (quoting Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co.
Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56 (1981)).
161. First Lincolnwood, 439 U.S. at 241. Under § 3(c) of the Act, the Board may disap-
prove any proposed acquisition, merger, or consolidation of a bank or bank holding company
if the transaction would result in a monopoly, lessen competition, or restrain trade. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(c) (1982). The Board may "take into consideration the financial and managerial re-
sources and future prospects of the [bank holding] company or companies and the banks con-
cerned, and the convenience and needs of the community to be served." Id.
162. First Lincolnwood, 439 U.S. at 248 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 381 (1969)).
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definition. The Board may still have broad authority to interpret other
sections of the Act, particularly when Congress expressly delegates to the
Board the authority to make policy, as it did under section 4(c)(8). Thus,
Dimension would not narrow the earlier interpretations of the Board's
policy-making authority.
On the other hand, the Court's decision may have more far-reaching
consequences. Dimension represents the first case in recent years in
which the Supreme Court questioned the Board's expertise regarding a
BHCA issue. 163 In the future, the Court may grant less deference to all
Board interpretations of the Act, including interpretations of sections in
which the language is ambiguous or general. However, because the
Court constrained its holding to the "bank" definition, the decision does
not appear to compel a narrower circumscription of Board authority.
C. Consequences of Dimension
The Supreme Court's decision in Dimension could have important
consequences in the banking industry. The decision severely restricts the
Board's efforts to halt the increasing number of nonbank banks. Thus, so
long as Congress does not change the "bank" definition, more bank
holding companies will use the loophole to expand across state lines, and
more nonbank parent companies will acquire nonbank banks to compete
in the financial services sector. The increased competition may benefit
consumers; however, the current regulatory sytem is arbitrary and unfair
because it gives substantially similar financial institutions disparate treat-
ment. The stability of the banking system also could suffer if nonbank
parent companies fail and drag down their nonbank bank subsidiaries
with them.16
Another likely consequence of Dimension is more litigation over the
"bank" definition. Although the Supreme Court struck down the
Board's interpretation, it did not set clear boundaries between what is a
"bank" and what is a "nonbank bank." Thus, institutions will probably
continue to test the boundaries of the definition by offering more types of
financial services while attempting to maintain "nonbank" status.
One such issue regarding the "bank" definition is whether tradi-
tional checking accounts that contain a "prior notice" clause qualify as
"demand deposits" under the current definition. Dimension did not face
163. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did overturn a Board order under the Glass-Stea-
gall Act, see supra note 16, in Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 142-44 (1984).
164. Some studies indicate that diversification into nonbanking activities decreases bank
holding company stability. See, eg., Holland, Bank Holding Companies and Financial Stabil-
ity, 10 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 577, 579-80 (1975); Kama, Bank Holding Com-
pany Profitability: Nonbanking Subsidiaries and Financial Leverage, 1979 J. BANK Ras. 28,
30-31 (90 of 109 bank holding companies surveyed had better profitability from their bank
subsidiaries than from their nonbank subsidiaries).
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the issue of whether a depositor's "legal right" to withdraw funds may be
withheld either by statutory restriction or contractual right. In Wilshire
Oil Co. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 165 the Third
Circuit held that a deposit agreement that reserved to the bank the right
to require advance notice from account holders prior to withdrawal from
checking accounts did not bring the checking accounts outside the "de-
mand deposit" prong of the BHCA "bank" test. 166 In First Bancorpora-
tion v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 167 however, the
Tenth Circuit held that NOW accounts were not "demand deposits"
even though such accounts function similarly to traditional checking ac-
counts. The court distinguished its holding from Wilshire because the
bank in that case was compelled by statute to reserve the right to require
advance notice prior to withdrawal; unlike Wilshire, the depositor's
"legal right" was not determined by a contract the sole purpose of which
was to take the financial institution outside the "bank" definition. 168
This distinction between statutory and contractual rights became
blurred in Oklahoma Bankers Association v. Federal Reserve Board. 169 In
that case, the Tenth Circuit held that a contract between a nonbank bank
and its depositors reserving to the bank the right to require advance no-
tice prior to withdrawal was sufficient to bring a deposit account outside
the "demand deposit" prong. The account in question was a "thrift de-
posit" account that did not function as a checking account and was not
regulated by Oklahoma law. Nevertheless, the court held that the source
of the restriction, whether state regulation or private contract, did not
matter in determining the depositor's "legal right" under the "demand
deposit" prong and that actual banking practices were irrelevant.' 70 In
apparent contradiction to this statement, however, the court cited Wil-
shire and added that "should the ... nonbank [bank] alter its deposit-
taking practices so as to violate the Act the Board may order that institu-
tion to cease and desist from such practices."' 171
The confusing decision in Oklahoma Bankers may be interpreted in
two ways. On one hand, the holding appears to have nullified the Wil-
shire rule, which looked to the depositor's ability "in practice" to with-
draw funds on demand. If this interpretation is correct, parent
companies would be able to evade BHCA coverage while acquiring non-
bank banks that offer full banking services simply by inserting a mean-
ingless "prior notice" requirement in their customers' demand deposit
165. 668 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982); see supra notes 91-97
and accompanying text.
166. Wilshire, 668 F.2d at 739-40.
167. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
168. First Bancorporation, 728 F.2d at 436.
169. 766 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1985).
170. Id. at 1449-50.
171. Id. at 1450.
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agreements. The Oklahoma Bankers decision would thus extend the
First Bancorporation holding by excluding not only NOW accounts from
the demand deposit prong, but also any deposit account, regardless of its
transactional capabilities, so long as the depositor does not have a con-
tractual or other legal right to withdraw funds on demand.
This extension is important, because NOW accounts are not avail-
able to commercial account holders.' 72 Thus, prior to Oklahoma Bank-
ers, nonbank banks could not offer full banking services to commercial
customers, which had to forego either demand deposits or commercial
loans. Now it appears that commercial customers may enjoy full service
banking on a nationwide basis simply by signing a contract that reserves
to the nonbank bank a never-exercised right to require advance notice
prior to withdrawal.
On the other hand, the Oklahoma Bankers decision may be con-
strued as upholding the Wilshire test of the depositor's "ability in prac-
tice" to withdraw on demand in determining whether checking accounts
that are not NOW accounts qualify as demand deposits under the
"bank" definition. This interpretation contradicts the court's earlier con-
clusion that a depositor's legal right, and not actual banking practices,
determines whether a deposit account falls within the "demand deposit"
prong and is therefore less likely to be adopted in subsequent cases. The
Supreme Court in Dimension did not address the statutory/contractual
right distinction. Thus, it is still unclear whether banking practice, statu-
tory rights, contractual rights, or all three determine whether an account
falls within the "demand deposit" prong of the BHCA "bank" test.
The scope of the "commercial loan" prong also remains in question.
The Supreme Court defined a "commercial loan" as a "direct loan from a
bank to a business customer for the purpose of providing funds needed
by the customer in its business." 173 This definition clearly does not in-
clude all loans from a bank to a commercial entity, however. For in-
stance, the Court held that the purchase of commercial paper, which
itself is an extension of commercial credit, was not within the "commer-
cial loan" prong.174 While it is clear that traditional commercial loans,
those that "entail the face-to-face negotiation of credit between borrower
and lender," fall within the prong, and the traditional notion of money
market instruments, which "do not appear to have the close borrower-
lender relationship.., of commercial loans,"'175 fall outside the prong,
there remains a gray area between the two types of transactions. Thus,
nonbank banks may soon attempt to broaden the traditional notion of
172. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(b) (1982).
173. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 686.
174. Id. at 687-88.
175. Id. (quoting letter from Baldwin P. Tuttle, Deputy General Counsel, Federal Reserve




money market transactions to expand their commercial lending business
while retaining "nonbank" status.
In sum, the current "bank" definition after Dimension allows banks
to evade the BHCA easily. Although the Supreme Court struck down
the Board's interpretation, the "bank" definition remains far from clear.
Unless the law is changed, litigation between the Board and nonbank
banks could continue. Even if the Court had upheld the Board's defini-
tion, however, institutions could still have easily avoided BHCA regula-
tion while defying the Act's purposes. 176  Moreover, the system
inequitably and arbitrarily subjects financial institutions to BHCA regu-
lation. Thus, Congress should redefine "bank" under the Act to end the
judicial confusion and to create a more equitable and secure regulatory
system.
V. Proposal for Congressional Action
Congress should amend the BHCA "bank" definition to close the
nonbank bank loophole and end further court battles over the proper
interpretation of this definition. Under current law, nonbank bank loop-
holes continue to allow holding companies to violate the BHCA's pur-
poses. A commercial entity may acquire a nonbank bank capable of
making commercial loans, and nonbank banks may be acquired by out-
of-state holding companies without state authorization. Thus, Congress
should define "bank" broadly enough to cover most types of financial
institutions that could defeat the purposes of the Act.
This Note proposes to achieve this goal by amending section 2(c) of
the BHCA to read:
"Bank" means any institution organized under the laws of the United
States, any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, any
territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Amercian Samoa, or the
Virgin Islands, except an institution chartered by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, the accounts of which are insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
This proposal changes the present definition by bringing under the
Act any institution that insures its deposits through the FDIC. Because
most financial institutions need federal deposit insurance to compete ef-
fectively, this definition will bring most banking institutions and their
holding companies under the Act, largely closing the "nonbank bank"
176. For example, in Florida Dep't of Banking and Fin. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 760 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. U.S. Trust Corp. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 106 S. Ct. 875 (1986), U.S. Trust, a New York bank
holding company, acquired a Florida nonbank bank subsidiary that did not meet even the
Board's expanded interpretation of the "bank" definition. The Florida Department of Banking
argued that the subsidiary defeated the purposes of the Douglas Amendment, which forbids
bank holding companies from acquiring out-of-state banks without approval from the state of
the acquired bank. See supra text accompanying notes 98-106 & 125.
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loophole. 177
In the past, Congress amended the "bank" definition to exclude cer-
tain institutions that, because of their very limited powers, could not
threaten the purposes of the BHCA. The assumptions behind these
amendments are no longer valid. For instance, in 1966, industrial banks
could not insure their deposits through the FDIC, offer checking ac-
counts, or make commercial loans. Today they are empowered to engage
in all three activities. In 1970, Congress excluded from the Act a small
number of banks that accepted demand deposits but did not make com-
mercial loans. Congress intended for the Board to construe this exception
narrowly; it is doubtful that Congress intended to enact a broad-based
exclusion for limited-service banks. Thus, unless Congress wishes to
abandon the purposes of the Act and maintain a system of regulatory
inequality, it should amend the "bank" definition to include all types of
banks that could threaten the Act.
This proposed definition is an improvement over the current defini-
tion for two reasons. First, by defining "bank" according to whether an
institution's accounts are insured by the FDIC, the Act would cover sub-
stantially all institutions chartered as banks. Almost any financial institu-
tion that wishes to compete for consumer and commercial deposits must
have FDIC insurance to assure customers that their deposits will be se-
cure. 178 The incentive to avoid BHCA regulation would be far out-
weighed by the disincentive to forego FDIC insurance. Thus, this
proposed definition ensures broad-based and equitable coverage. Second,
the definition is easy to administer. It draws a bright line between those
insitutions that are subject to the Act and those that are not. It would
not require Board discretion to prevent evasions of the Act's coverage.
The current transaction-based definition no longer works because of
the ease with which banks may evade BHCA regulation. Some commen-
tators have argued for a loosening of the nonbank and interstate banking
restrictions that exist under current federal law, including the BHCA.179
While such reforms may be useful, it is also clear that banks should com-
pete on an even playing field. Thus, regardless of the level of regulation
Congress wishes to retain, it should apply this regulation uniformly to all
banks. This redefinition of "bank" partially achieves this goal.
177. The definition retains the current exemption for institutions chartered by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB"), however, because holding companies of these institu-
tions are regulated by the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act ("SLHCA"), 12 U.S.C. §
1730a (1982 & Supp. III 1984). See supra note 5. New FHLBB-chartered savings banks are
insured by the FDIC. Such institutions would remain subject to the SLHCA and not the
BHCA.
178. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Note, The Demise of the Bank/Nonbank Distinction: An Argument for
Deregulating the Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REV. 650, 659 (1985).
[Vol. 38
Conclusion
The present definition of "bank" under the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 has created confusion and inconsistent case law. The defini-
tion has created a loophole leading to the proliferation of "nonbank
banks," institutions that perform most bank functions but are not regu-
lated as banks. Nonbank banks are often at odds with congressional pur-
poses under the BHCA, because they promote the concentration of
banking resources, the mix of commerce and banking, and interstate
banking without state authorization. The Federal Reserve Board of
Governors tried to curb the growth of nonbank banks through orders
and regulations liberally interpreting the BHCA "bank" definition. The
Supreme Court has disapproved this use of broad authority and, as a
result, nonbank banks continue to undermine congressional purposes in
enacting the BHCA. Moreover, many legal issues surrounding the
"bank" definition remain unresolved. Thus, Congress should redefine
"bank" under the BHCA to end confusion and to further the original
purposes of the BHCA.
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